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In Shakespeare’s King Richard III (act 1, scene 3, line 351), the Duke of
Gloucester hires two men to do away with a rival and encourages them to
do it quickly, so the victim will not have the chance to plead for mercy and
perhaps “move [their] hearts to pity.” The ﬁrst murderer reassures the
Duke, “Fear not, my lord, we will not stand to prate [prattle]; talkers are no
good doers.”
This paper is about the critics of the “doers” of globalization. A variety
of concerns motivate these critics, but the common thread is the belief that
the distribution of globalization’s beneﬁts is unbalanced and that this is the
inevitable result of policies and processes that are undemocratic and,
therefore, illegitimate. The critics want the doers to stop and talk. The do-
ers dismiss the critics’ concerns as unrelated to economic globalization or
as misinformed and misguided; they want to keep doing as they have been
doing. This paper describes who the critics are, where they came from,
what they want, and how economists, policymakers, and others might un-
derstand them better.
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Spring 2002.the Duke’s intended victim, feeling that they could not get a word in edge-
wise before the forces of globalization rolled over them. Many proponents
of globalization did not want to talk or even listen. Activists responded by
mounting large street protests at each major meeting of the key interna-
tional organizations—the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva
(1998) and Seattle (1999); the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank in Prague and Washington, DC (2000); the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) in Quebec (2001); and the Group of Eight (G8) in
Genoa (2001). Also because slogans (e.g., “Fifty Years is Enough,” “Fix it
or nix it,” “Dump the debt,” “People over proﬁts,” “Jobs with justice,” or
“Another world is possible”) ﬁt on posters better than elaborate plans to
change the world, their demands often seemed more strident than they are.
Although the protesters in the streets represent a number of diﬀerent
movements, they share, in the words of one critic, “a belief that the dis-
parate problems with which they are wrestling all derive from global de-
regulation, an agenda that is concentrating power and wealth into fewer
and fewer hands” (Klein 2000, 19). Above all else, the disparate elements
of this broad “Mobilization for Global Justice,” as a major umbrella coali-
tion is called, are held together by a concern that the processby which glob-
alization’s rules are being written and implemented is undermining democ-
racy at both the national and international levels. Under this umbrella of
shared concerns, the various groups tend to cluster around one of three is-
sues as a focus of their particular globalization critique.
• The environment
• Human rights and worker rights
• Inequality and poverty (particularly in developing countries)
Economists and policymakers might recognize some of these concerns
as relating to environmental externalities, imperfectly competitive labor
markets, or inadequate distributional mechanisms. But when the activists
and protesters claimed credit for killing the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment in 1998 and for blocking a consensus to launch new multilateral
trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999, the initial response from many doers
was a backlash against the anti-globalization backlash. In some quarters,
there was a tendency to circle the wagons and to reject compromise as the
ﬁrst step down the slippery slope towards protectionism.
One step in moving beyond the dialogue of the deaf is to orient the crit-
ics’ concerns in terms of potential market failures that economic analysis
already recognizes. A second is to recognize that not all of the critics are
anti-globalization, some are, but others are not. With the end of the Cold
War, some see anti-globalization as a new front in the long-running battle
between socialism and capitalism. But other critics, including many with a
religious orientation, are strongly internationalist and want to see global-
ization proceed, albeit under diﬀerent rules. We will refer to these latter
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“movement” for the full spectrum of activists opposed to current global-
ization trends.
This paper will attempt to identify important groups involved in the al-
ternative globalization movement. It will also attempt to sketch a picture
of the key issues and concerns that motivate them in a way that is broadly
representative and intelligible to economists.1 In so doing, we hope to cap-
ture the concerns of Southern as well as Northern groups and to analyze
the issues that divide as well as bring them together. Finally, we will analyze
key elements of the critiques of current globalization and representative al-
ternative proposals, assessing both their merits and weaknesses.
The sections on the roots of the movement and who the critics are cast a
rather wide net, but the presentation and analysis of what the critics want
focuses on key groups that have oﬀered alternatives, detailed recommen-
dations, or speciﬁc critiques. We will address only in passing the true anti-
globalizers, those who might be characterized as localists on the left and
nationalists on the right.2
1.2 The Roots of the Alternative Globalization Movement
Poverty, inequality, human rights, and protection of the environment are
hardly new issues. Transnational advocacy on human rights by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) predates World War I, going back at
least to the anti-slavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lorenz 2001). The International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO), created to protect the peace by promoting social justice,
was founded in 1919 and is the only surviving League of Nations institu-
tion. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the United Nations
(UN) dates to 1948. Concern for the environment is a more recent issue for
global activists, but it is one that has grown rapidly since the ﬁrst UN con-
ference on the environment in 1972. The NGO involvement in poverty and
development issues has traditionally been more on the operational side,
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1. Similar eﬀorts include Ostry (2001) and Florini (2002).
2. On the right, anti-globalizers oppose international rules that constrain national sover-
eignty and power as well as trade or investment that undermines American industry and con-
trol. Some of these critics are xenophobic as well. On the left, localists want to maintain max-
imal independence at the grassroots level and oppose most broader centralization, including
the economic homogenization associated with national and global markets and especially,
global agreements that impinge on local autonomy. Unlike the nationalists on the right, the
localists are not anti-internationalist, and their interests sometimes overlap with the alterna-
tive globalization movement, for example, on preserving local or national policy autonomy
in the environmental area, but they share with the right the goal of rolling back globaliza-
tion.On the right, see, for example, Buchanan (2000); on the left, see International Forum on
Globalization (2002), Hines (2000), echoes in Korten (1999), and even in Gandhi (1996; see
the speech “Economic and Moral Progress” presented to the Muir College Economic Soci-
ety in 1916).raising and distributing funds and planning projects, particularly emer-
gency relief. Transnational-policy advocacy on behalf of poor people in
poor countries emerged more recently as a result of the debt crisis and in-
creased involvement in development policy on the part of the international
ﬁnancial institutions.
Thus, Mobilization for Global Justice and the similar groups that have
been dogging international meetings and summits for the past ﬁve years
represent a coming together of several advocacy strands that have been op-
erating on largely separate tracks for a number of years. Demands by civil
society to be included in international rule making on economic issues
emerged as a response to the expanding scope of that rule making into in a
broad range of regulatory areas. That is, groups focusing on environmen-
tal issues, human rights, and development issues began to come together in
the 1990s because they perceived that pro-globalization priorities were im-
pinging upon their own and, therefore, that they had a common interest in
challenging both the substance and the process as the rules governing
globalization were developed. In addition, the development of communi-
cations technology that could handle large amounts of information facili-
tated the task of transnational and cross-issue organizing. A brief sum-
mary of the evolution of each of the strands follows.
1.2.1 The Environment
Since the creation of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) at the
global Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the UN has been
a key institutional focus for transnational advocacy on environmental is-
sues ranging from ﬁsheries, forestry, and other resource management to
combating the ozone hole and global warming. Almost from the begin-
ning, NGOs were recognized as playing an important role in the process,
in part because many of them bring technical expertise that would other-
wise not be available (UNEP 2001). Just a year after UNEP was created,
an NGO oﬃce was established to oversee civil society participation in its
activities. Today, there are roughly 200 multilateral environmental agree-
ments, with representatives of civil society often playing an important role
in various aspects of negotiation and implementation.3
An ambitious attempt to integrate environmental issues under the sus-
tainable development rubric was made at the 1992 UN Conference on En-
vironment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
with extensive involvement from NGOs. The UNEP estimates that repre-
sentatives from 800 NGOs from 160 countries were present in Rio, reﬂect-
ing as well their intense involvement in planning the conference (UNEP
2001). The UNCED resulted in an action plan for addressing a long list of
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3. For example, see chapter nineteen of Benedick (1998) on the negotiation of the Montreal
Protocol on ozone depletion.environmental problems, dubbed “Agenda 21,” as well as the founding of
the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) to monitor imple-
mentation of the (largely voluntary) commitments. In order to facilitate
their ongoing involvement, an NGO steering committee was created by
the CSD and roughly 400 groups were accredited as of the end of 2001. A
decade later, tens of thousands of public- and private-sector representa-
tives are expected to gather in Johannesburg, South Africa, to review (lim-
ited) progress and to discuss the next phase of implementation, but plan-
ning has been marred by sharp disagreements over the responsibility of
developed countries to increase resource transfers to poor countries for de-
velopment and environmental protection, as well as the relative rights and
responsibilities of multinational corporations in sustainable development.
1.2.2 Human Rights and Worker Rights
Like environmental groups, human rights groups have traditionally fo-
cused on governments and the UN regarding the promotion of universal
norms and standards. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, transnational ad-
vocacy groups involved in the ﬁght against apartheid in South Africa, frus-
trated by the unresponsiveness of governments, turned their attention di-
rectly to corporations. After years of futilely pushing governments and the
UN to formally impose sanctions on the apartheid regime, activists turned
to pressuring multinational corporations operating in South Africa as a
second-best conduit for pressuring the government there. At a minimum,
activists such as Leon Sullivan hoped that the code of corporate conduct
bearing his name would improve the day-to-day lives of black workers
under apartheid. Many of the groups that are active today in the anti-
sweatshop movement—including the Interfaith Center for Corporate Re-
sponsibility, the Investor Responsibility Research Council, and Reverend
Sullivan—have their roots in the anti-apartheid movement, as do many of
the tactics used today, such as corporate codes of conduct, shareholder res-
olutions, boycotts, and other market-based campaigns to promote change.
1.2.3 Development and Poverty
Groups concerned with human rights, particularly of indigenous
peoples, and the environment in developing countries turned their atten-
tion to the international ﬁnancial institutions in the 1980s, beginning with
criticism of the World Bank for ignoring the environmental and human
consequences of its large infrastructure projects and for failing to consult
with local people aﬀected by those projects. The IMF became a target
somewhat later as policies developed to respond to the debt crisis, triggered
by Mexico in 1982, failed either to resolve the debt problem quickly or to
restore economic growth. In the 1990s, many of these concerns coalesced
around the issue of debt relief and Jubilee 2000, which began in the United
Kingdom, and became a global phenomenon, fronted by rock stars and
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cism of the IMF, in particular, escalated sharply in the late 1990s when
many mainstream economists were questioning their response to the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis as well as the Fund’s earlier push for increased capital-
market liberalization in developing countries without prudential regula-
tions in place.
1.2.4 The Trade System and Social Issues
The General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) was created in
1948 as a mechanism for contracting parties to multilaterally negotiate re-
ductions in trade barriers. It was regarded by aﬃliated governments and
most observers as relatively eﬀective in unwinding the high Depression-era
tariﬀs that lingered after World War II, but as relatively weak in settling
disputes over more diﬃcult issues, such as agricultural protection and non-
tariﬀ barriers (Elliott and Hufbauer 2001). Thus, for most of its ﬁrst forty
years, it was largely ignored by advocacy groups. In this period, neither
governments nor civil society groups particularly challenged the notion
that the major constituencies that needed to be consulted about trade ne-
gotiations were business and organized labor. The dynamics of trade ne-
gotiations changed dramatically in the 1990s, however, particularly after
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which expanded the scope
of trade rules in areas such as product health and safety, drugs and other
patents, and instituted a more binding enforcement system under the
WTO.
As the Uruguay Round progressed, it appeared to many critics that all
of the major international economic organizations were moving in a simi-
lar, deregulatory direction, placing more and more constraints on the abil-
ity of governments to organize economic activity. In the early 1990s, GATT
dispute-settlement panels twice ruled against a U.S. ban on imported tuna,
the harvesting of which resulted in the killing of dolphins. The decisions
shocked and angered environmental advocates who had lobbied for the
Marine Mammal Protection Act to protect the environment and who had
no protectionist intent. Around the same time, the United States and Mex-
ico (joined later by Canada) decided to negotiate a “deep integration”
trade agreement without accompanying rules on the environment or work-
ing conditions.
The decision to negotiate the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) seemed to the critics to bring the specter of a race to the bottom
right to America’s borders and it began to pull together the separate
strands of environmental, human rights, and development advocacy into
today’s movement for alternative globalization (Aaronson 2001; Mayer
1998). Despite vigorous protests from NGOs and only after much debate,
Congress approved the NAFTA agreement in November 1993. In defer-
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ton had directed his trade representative to negotiate side deals to accom-
pany the agreement, which was completed by President George H. W.
Bush just before the 1992 election. The labor agreement did little to ap-
pease labor opponents, but the side agreement on environmental issues
was regarded by moderate environmental groups as a positive step for-
ward, and several of them endorsed NAFTA. Within a few years, however,
those groups became disillusioned with the implementation of the side
agreement and increasingly concerned by corporate challenges to environ-
mental regulations under NAFTA’s investment provisions. When renewal
of “fast-track” or “trade promotion authority” was debated again in the
late 1990s, the environmental community was much more uniﬁed in its
opposition.
The next target of this growing movement against (corporate-led) eco-
nomic globalization was the U.S.-led eﬀort to negotiate a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The opposition again centered as
much on process as on substance and, in particular, the perception that this
was an attempt to secretly negotiate rules to further empower global cor-
porations. When the OECD ﬁnally admitted failure in 1998, the anti-MAI
forces were more than happy to declare victory in defeating it, even though
careful analysis suggests that the agreement might well have fallen under
the weight of its own contradictions—driven by intergovernmental diﬀer-
ences on policy—even without the NGO protests (Henderson 2000; Gra-
ham 2000). Regardless, the movement had more than enough momentum
to carry it into the streets of Seattle for a WTO ministerial meeting in late
1999 that was intended to launch a new round of multilateral trade negoti-
ations. Like the MAI, the critical diﬀerences in Seattle were as much be-
tween governments themselves as they were between governments and the
protesters, but the “turtle-teamster” coalition and others were more than
happy to take credit and to continue riding the wave of momentum.4
1.3 Who Are Globalization’s Critics Today?
Clearly transnational advocacy is not a recent phenomenon. Neverthe-
less, just as clearly, the scale of activity has increased sharply in recent
years. As of the late 1990s, Edwards (2001, 4) and Florini (2001, 29) cite ﬁg-
ures ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 for the number of transnational NGOs,
most of them formed since 1970 and many inspired by and focused on UN
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4. In 1998, a WTO panel ruled against a U.S. law banning shrimp imports from countries
that did not require the use of “turtle-excluder devices” to allow endangered sea turtles to es-
cape from shrimp nets. To highlight what they viewed as yet another outrageous decision,
many activists wore turtle costumes during the Seattle protests.activities in a variety of areas.5 Of these, hundreds, perhaps thousands, are
aﬃliated with the movement challenging economic globalization, and they
cover a broad spectrum of views, from the anarchists of the Black Bloc,
who are against all forms of institutional control, to mainstream religious
or charitable organizations, such as the American Friends Service Com-
mittee and Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), which
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. In-between are groups that fundamen-
tally oppose the capitalist economic model and others that just want to
push it in a more humane direction.
The appendix lists roughly 100 coalitions, networks, and groups that
work on globalization issues from a critical perspective and that we believe
are the most important. Because we cannot identify the full universe of al-
ternative globalization groups, it is diﬃcult to determine the criteria for a
representative sample, and, for purposes of creating the appendix, only the
most general criteria were used. Groups listed are concerned with the con-
sequences of economicglobalization and are involved in advocacy. This ex-
cludes large numbers of local community groups concerned about the en-
vironment or economic justice; others that are interested in global but
noneconomic issues (for example land mines); and some research or devel-
opment groups that do not also engage in advocacy.
We  began with the list compiled for a Financial Times series on the
counter-capitalist movement (October 2001), then added others with
which we were personally familiar and that seem to show up again and
again at protests and in the press.6 In an eﬀort to exclude marginal groups
while ensuring that we did not leave out major ones, we turned to the in-
ternet search engine Google, which has a toolbar that provides a website’s
page rank, backward links, and a list of similar pages. Google’s page rank
purports to show the relative importance of a website, on a scale from one
to ten, based on how many other pages link to it, weighted in turn by the
relative importance of those pages. Backward links give the number of
links from other websites to a particular website. The similar pages func-
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5. As of 2001, more than 120 NGOs had general accreditation status with the UN’s Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC), meaning that they could send observers to meetings
and submit written statements to ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies; roughly 1,000 had spe-
cial accreditation status, meaning that they may be consulted and attend meetings on speciﬁc
issues where they have speciﬁc competence; and nearly 1,000 were on the UN’s third-tier ros-
ter of groups that can be called upon by UN bodies when appropriate. Edwards (2001, 9)
notes, however, that less than one-ﬁfth of the NGOs with consultative status are from devel-
oping countries. For a list of NGOs with consultative status, see http://www.un.org/partners/
civil_society/ngo/n-ecosoc.htm#top. The search function allows visitors to search for partic-
ular organizations and then get contact information for them.
6. The ﬁrst part of the planned series appeared in the Financial Times on 10 September,
2001 as part of the run-up to the Bank-Fund meetings at the end of the month. After the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks, the series was put on the shelf until 10 October, 2001, when a new
piece on the challenges facing the counter-capitalism movement in the new environment
appeared. At the same time, the full series was published on the FT’s website at http://
specials.ft.com/countercap/index.html.tion lists roughly two dozen websites that are most similar to the website in
question.7
Groups that had a page rank of at least 6, the majority, were kept on the
list; the highest rank of any group is 8. Besides the two large networking
sites at the top of the list, large membership groups with lots of chapters,
such as the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and Amnesty International, gener-
ally have the highest rankings in the sample. To put the rankings in per-
spective, we were unable to ﬁnd any website that received a rank of 10. The
UN, the World Bank, and the White House websites have rankings of 9,
while the IMF, WTO, and ILO each get an 8. After culling the low-ranking
groups, we selected the highest-ranked groups in each of our functional ar-
eas—human and worker rights, the environment, and development—and
used the similar pages function to ensure that other important groups were
not left out. While there are undoubtedly many other NGOs in the poten-
tial universe, we believe we were able to identify the key players in the move-
ment and avoid including any that are unimportant.
1.3.1 Explanation of Categories
The groups in this movement diﬀer in three important dimensions that
we have tried to document in the appendix: issues on which they focus;
roles they play within the movement; and their advocacy style. We brieﬂy
discuss each in turn.
Key Issues
We categorized groups by the broad strands of transnational advocacy
discussed above—development, human rights, and the environment—and
added a fourth category of multi-issue group or coalition/network for the
many groups that advocate broad reforms of global institutions or, even,
the system as a whole. This was not easy. Human rights and environmen-
tal groups are usually interested in sustainable, equitable, and democratic
development as well, and development-oriented groups are obviously in-
terested in human rights and the environment. We tried to assign the
groups to categories based on the lensthrough which they approach issues,
not the narrowness with which they focus.
Roles in the Movement
The NGOs, collectively and individually, play a variety of roles in the
movement, and the assignment of categories was, again, not easy. Some tilt
more toward activism and others more toward research; some also provide
not-for-proﬁt services, such as emergency relief in crises, monitoring and
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bers change a bit from day to day. Our numbers are accurate up to 3 May, 2002, the date upon
which we ran the Google search and rankings.veriﬁcation of corporate compliance with codes of conduct, and legal ser-
vices in advocacy lawsuits. For reasons of access, we have focused on
groups that have websites, as most do today, which means that all groups
have some role in disseminating information. Those identiﬁed as such here,
however, are those that focus on collecting and disseminating information,
either of a general nature (Common Dreams) or of particular utility in ac-
tivist campaigns (CorpWatch). Although they may include brieﬁng papers
or articles by group staﬀ on their websites, original research is not the fo-
cus of these groups.
Advocacy Style
Morton Winston of the College of New Jersey and Amnesty Interna-
tional has categorized groups working on corporate social responsibil-
ity issues into Confronters, who take an adversarial approach to corpora-
tions in the belief that only the threat of reduced proﬁts will induce them to
improve conditions, and Engagers, who work to help ﬁrms do “the right
thing” (Winston 2001). Although not all NGOs working on globalization
issues fall into one of these two categories, similar labels could be applied
to groups working in other areas, such as those seeking to reform the in-
ternational ﬁnancial institutions and the WTO. Following Winston’s lead,
we deﬁne these categories based, not on their protest tactics (which may
be quite confrontational), but on their willingness to engage with their an-
tagonists, whether multinational corporations (MNCs) or international
economic institutions. Thus, those that have explicitly rejected any coop-
eration with or that have called for the abolition of existing economic
institutions are classiﬁed as confronters; those that have joined in multi-
stakeholder initiatives that include representatives of all parties interested
in an issue, such as the UN Global Compact or the Forestry Stewardship
Council, are classiﬁed as engagers.
1.4 What Do They Want?
Many of these talkers are also doers. The Jubilee movement is perhaps
the most successful and uses rock stars, such as Bono, that help thousands
of average churchgoers and other activists to put debt relief at the center of
development discussions. Oxfam International is now following up that
campaign with a new one to “make trade fair” and ensure that the new
Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations will be, as promised, a de-
velopment round. In the Jubilee movement’s case, activists were able to
focus on broad goals—reducing debt burdens as broadly and deeply as
possible and using the proceeds to alleviate poverty—while Oxfam In-
ternational’s trade campaign is based on a nearly 300 page report calling
for detailed changes in national and international policies by a variety of
actors.
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Seattle? Is it just cacophony or is there a coherent message? While it is clear
from the appendix that this is a “movement of movements” with no single
leader or agenda, it is possible to identify common concerns that bring
them together. First, the critics reject arguments that growth is both neces-
sary andsuﬃcient to spread globalization’s beneﬁts equitably. They believe
that, under current rules, the well-oﬀ and mobile “haves” beneﬁt relatively
more than immobile “have-nots”; salaries and dividends have increased
while wages in many countries declined or stagnated. And they believe that
this is, in part, the result of disproportionate corporate inﬂuence on the
rule-making process.
Therefore, in order to achieve more inclusive outcomes from globaliza-
tion, the critics also believe that it is necessary to address the democratic
deﬁcit in current globalization decision making and to make it more in-
clusive (see Hamilton’s chapter two in this volume). Almost every group in-
volved in the protests against the IMF, World Bank, and WTO emphasizes
process as much as substance. The International Labor Rights Fund’s
Pharis Harvey opposed fast-track trade-negotiating authority for the pres-
ident in 1991 as much because he thought the process was an end run
around democracy as because of what might be negotiated with it (Mayer
1998, 76). Thus, whatever other issues are raised, globalization’s critics put
increased transparency and accountability at the top of their list of de-
mands for how national governments and the international institutions
address globalization issues.
Finally, critics see far more market failure and regulatory imbalance in
current globalization than proponents do. They also trust government reg-
ulation more, at least in transparent and accountable systems. This, in
turn, leads the critics to diﬀerent conclusions than the enthusiasts regard-
ing which rules and regulations need to be harmonized and in which areas
diversity should be respected. Many critics reject current globalization
trends and the rules promoting it as homogenizing forces that squeeze out
cultural diversity and national and local policy autonomy in many areas.
Table 1.1 illustrates some of the diﬀerences as they relate to the major in-
ternational economic institutions. The WTO rules, for example, promote
harmonization of product standards while defending diversity in process
standards—with the important exception of the agreement on trade-
related intellectual-property rights (TRIPs). For the critics, this is evidence
that globalization enthusiasts want to promote market integration at the
expense of workers, the poor, and the environment. They typically want to
preserve more space for national-policy autonomy in these areas, and to
harmonize in areas where there are global externalities or public goods.
Their exception is support for global labor standards and some environ-
mental issues, even where international spillovers are limited, and, on these
issues, Northern and Southern critics sometimes part company.
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the speciﬁc concerns that motivate diﬀerent movement groups in our three
broad functional areas: development and poverty, human rights and
worker rights, and the environment. We begin with the broad-development
critique of globalization (as it is currently proceeding) because it is often
joined by human rights and environmental NGOs, and thus it is more ho-
listic and, on average, less divisive than some of the narrower issues, such
as international labor standards or how to address climate change. We then
follow with some of the more speciﬁc labor, human rights, and environ-
mental criticisms and then conclude with a summary of a far-reaching pro-
posal from a broad coalition, including representatives from the North and
South, for a fundamentally diﬀerent approach to globalization and eco-
nomic and social organization.
1.4.1 The Development NGOs’ Critique of the 
International Economic Institutions
Much of the development NGOs’ critique of globalization is a rejection
of the “Washington Consensus” model of development, which, as pro-
moted by the international ﬁnancial institutions, is interpreted as requiring
macroeconomic austerity, privatization, and a relatively laissez-faire ap-
proach to economic management, all of which are alleged to exacerbate
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Table 1.1 Critics’ Views of Harmonization and Diversity in the Current International
Economic Order
Rules That Are Too Constraining  Rules That Are Missing 
(pro-diversity arguments) (pro-harmonization arguments)
WTO and trade  TRIPs, SPS/TBT, government procure- Core labor standards, global tax 
agreements ment, trade remedy laws, NAFTA  evasion, climate change, species/ 
chapter 11, article XX interpretations  habitat loss
of national environmental laws
Potential areas of  Free trade in public services, rights and responsibilities for foreign 
rules negotiation investors, S&D in subsidy and other industrial policies for LDCs, 
relationship between WTO and MEAs, competition policy
IMFa “Washington consensus” condition- “Odious debt” avoidance and relief, ﬁ-
ality, macroeconomic austerity, capital  nancial market volatility (Tobin tax), 
mobility (now under review) CLS and environmental protections
World Bank Structural adjustment lending  Protection of human (indigenous 
conditionality peoples) rights and the environment in 
project and sectoral lending, especially 
in resource extraction
Notes: TRIPs   trade-related intellectual property rights agreement; SPS/TBT   agreements on sani-
tary and phytosanitary, and technical barriers to trade; S&D  special and diﬀerential treatment; MEA
  multilateral environmental agreement; CLS   core labor standards.
aIn implicit collusion with ﬁnancial markets.unemployment and poverty.8 Another major target are the large infra-
structure projects often funded or guaranteed by the World Bank, which
NGOs opposed because they seem prone to corruption, increased indebt-
edness, and environmental degradation. In advance of the 2002 World
Bank and IMF joint meetings in Washington, D.C., the Mobilization for
Global Justiceand its aﬃliated groups coalesced around four core demands
for reform of the two institutions.9
1. Open all World Bank and IMF meetings to the media and the public.
2. Cancel all impoverished-country debt to the World Bank and IMF
using the institutions’ own resources.
3. End all World Bank and IMF policies that hinder people’s access to
food, clean water, shelter, health care, education, and right to organize.
(Such structural-adjustment policies include user fees, privatization, and
economic austerity programs.)
4. Stop all World Bank support for socially and environmentally de-
structive projects, such as oil, gas, and mining activities, and all support for
projects, such as dams, that include forced relocation of people.
In addition, many development activists, particularly in the wake of the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis and, more recently, Argentina, are concerned about
capital-market volatility and want the Bank and Fund to allow more mea-
sures to head oﬀ potential ﬁnancial crises, including measures such as an
international Tobin tax or more latitude for countries to impose capital
controls. The Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for
the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC; available at http://www.attac.org/indexen.
htm) started with the Tobin tax as its key proposal, both to reduce capital-
market volatility and to raise funds for development.
In the run up to the spring 2002 meetings of the Bank and Fund, a U.S.
Civil Society Coalition, representing twenty-seven labor, environmental,
religious, and other groups, released a proposal for responsible reform of
the World Bank.10 Besides addressing the usual issues of debt relief, trans-
parency, poverty, and environmental-impact statements, the document
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8. The term “Washington Consensus” was originally coined by John Williamson in 1990 to
describe a set of ten broad policies around which consensus among policymakers seemed to
exist regarding the basic reforms needed in the ﬁrst stages of economic stabilization. The term
has since been used to refer to a more speciﬁc set of neoliberal—or market fundamentalist—
economic policies that go well beyond either consensus or what Williamson himself intended
(Williamson 1997).
9. For additional background, see http://www.globalizethis.org/ﬁghtback/feature.cfm?ID
 37. These demands were originally developed in anticipation of the 2001 joint meetings,
which were cancelled following the September 11 terrorist attacks. For the World Bank’s re-
sponse at that time and a counter response by Jubilee USA and nineteen other groups, see
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/pbfourdemands.htm and http://www.jubileeusa.org/
jubilee.cgi?path /learn_more/&page rebuttal.html.
10. The report is available on the website of the Bank Information Center at http://www.
bicusa.org.also includes speciﬁc proposals on worker rights, forest protection, pesti-
cides, gender issues, HIV/AIDS, and water policy. These groups are not
against international-ﬁnancial ﬂows, per se, but they do want to see diﬀer-
ent rules to govern them.
More fundamentally, many critics of globalization argue that it has not
produced the promised growth. The Center for Economic and Policy Re-
search (CEPR), based in Washington, D.C. has published several papers
highlighting the lack of growth in many developing countries during a pe-
riod of rapid globalization under the tutelage of the Bank, IMF, and the
WTO. Their papers, “Scorecard on Globalization” and “The Emperor
Has No Growth,”11 point out that, even as the inﬂuence of these institu-
tions increased over the last twenty years, growth in many low- and middle-
income countries lagged. They see this lack of growth as evidence that the
neoliberal Washington Consensus is not beneﬁting the majority of the
world’s peoples.12
The Fifty Years is Enough (FYIE) organization has taken a more radi-
cal stance than these critics, calling for reparations for the eﬀects of struc-
tural-adjustment policies and for the social and environmental eﬀects
Bank projects; privatization or abolition of Bank entities (the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation [IFC] and the Multilatteral Investment Guar-
antee Agency [MIGA]) that provide assistance to the private sector; and
personal and institutional accountability for Bank and Fund complicity
in corruption. Also, FYIE calls for an assessment of the International Fi-
nancial Institutions’ (IFI) future—including the possibility of abolition
in the absence of radical reform—but, at a minimum, this group wants to
weaken and reduce the funding available to them.13
Although FYIE calls for the money to be transferred to other, more ac-
ceptable (to them) forms of assistance, the demand to reduce IFI funds,
along with diﬀerences among some groups over the details of debt relief,
have at times divided Northern and Southern NGOs working on develop-
ment issues (Nelson 2001, 71–72). While largely agreeing with Northern
NGO demands to reform IFI programs and conditionality and to restruc-
ture the institutions to give client countries more of a say in decision mak-
ing, Southern NGOs have been more skeptical of demands to shrink these
institutions. Jubilee South has also gone further than some Northern-
based groups in terms of demanding unconditional debt relief and repa-
rations for slavery, colonialism, and “odious debt” (Collins, Gariyo, and
Burdon 2001; www.jubileesouth.net).
Although development-oriented NGOs from both the North and South
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11. See http://www.cepr.net for links to all of their publications.
12. For other skeptical analyses of growth-globalization links, see Khor (2000), Rodrik
(2001a), and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001).
13. See http://www.50years.org/s28/demands.html; see also http://www.50years.org/about/
platform.html.continue to push for broader and deeper debt relief, they are increasingly
focusing on what is needed to restore growth and promote equitable devel-
opment after debt relief. Perhaps inspired by the call in Doha in November
2001 to make the just-launched WTO trade negotiations a development
round, many NGOs are now focusing on what they see as inequities in the
trading system that discriminate against developing-country exports.
In two publications linked to the launch of the new Doha round or to
multilateral trade negotiations, Oxfam International recognizes the poten-
tial contribution of international trade and investment to economic devel-
opment in poor countries, and it criticizes the hypocrisy of rich countries
that promote globalization’s growth beneﬁts while disproportionately re-
stricting developing-country exports to their markets. The Oxfam reports
focus, in particular, on the inequities in the agriculture and intellectual-
property agreements that were negotiated during the Uruguay Round.
But, unlike World Bank and other traditional trade economists who have
written reports with similar titles, Oxfam International has not embraced
unconditional free trade, and their vision of “Harnessing Trade for Devel-
opment” (Oxfam International 2001) couples increased market access for
poor-country exports with increased ﬂexibility for those countries to use
industrial and trade policies as part of their development strategy. Thus,
Oxfam recommends
• “[T]ransition periods for implementing WTO agreements [that are]
based on development milestones not arbitrary dates;”
• Replacement of the single undertaking to give developing countries
more ﬂexibility in signing on to WTO agreements;
• Reform of the dispute settlement understanding to make it fairer and
more workable for the less-developed countries (LDCs) and to ensure
that rulings take into account poverty, human rights, and environ-
mental eﬀects (consider joint panels with specialized UN bodies)
• Increased technical assistance and capacity-building for LDCs.
• Decision-making processes that “increase eﬀective participation of
developing countries;” and
• Increased access to documents and public scrutiny through “more ac-
tive involvement of national parliaments and regular consultations
with civil society” (Oxfam International 2001, executive summary and
policy proposals, 9–10).
In addition, the report underlying the new Oxfam International cam-
paign to make trade fair puts trade into the broader context of national and
international development policies, including trade-related conditionality
and project selection in the IMF and World Bank, as well as the applica-
tion of WTO rules to poor countries. But the concluding chapter, “Making
Trade Work for the Poor,” begins with the national policies to improve
health and education and to reduce corruption that need to be in place if
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alization.14
Finally, an issue that has led to increased criticism of the World Bank in
recent years is its support of natural-resource-extraction projects, particu-
larly in institutionally weak and often corrupt developing countries. The
NGOs, including many local ones, have criticized these projects for in-
fringing upon human rights (particularly of indigenous groups), degrading
the environment, and feeding corrupt, often repressive regimes. Oxfam
America recently weighed in on these issues in a policy paper that con-
cludes that heavy dependence on resource extraction fails to reduce
poverty in many cases, even if it succeeds in raising growth (Ross 2001).
The report calls for international assistance to oil- and mineral-dependent
countries to diversify their economies; full disclosure of ﬁnancial transac-
tions between extractive ﬁrms and host governments; international ﬁnan-
cial assistance to develop extractive sectors only if the host governments
are democratic and “have demonstrated a commitment to ﬁghting pov-
erty” (Ross 2001, 18); and support only for projects with safeguards to en-
sure that some revenue goes to poverty alleviation and with independent
monitoring to guard against corruption.
One example of eﬀorts to address some of these issues may be found in
the guidelines negotiated by the World Bank and other stakeholders when
the Bank agreed to support a Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project (avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj). The safeguards include ex-
tensive reviews of the potential environmental impacts; dialogue with local
people along the pipeline route regarding resettlement, compensation, and
a revenue management plan; and independent external monitoring to
guard against corruption. While the agreement may serve as a model for
these projects, questions about implementation were raised almost imme-
diately when Chad’s government appeared to divert some of the project
revenues to buy weapons for the military. Additional criticisms followed
quickly (e.g., see Friends of the Earth International 2001).15
1.4.2 Labor and Environmental Critiques of Globalization
A principal aim of development NGO’s critiques of globalization is to
increase resource transfers from North to South, and, therefore, Northern
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14. “Harnessing Trade for Development” seems a more apt title or slogan for Oxfam’s cam-
paign, which includes special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries, than does
the more recent and more polemical “Rigged Rules and Double Standards” (Oxfam Inter-
national 2002). Both reports are available on the Oxfam International website at http://www.
oxfam.org. See also Rodrik (2001b; The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really
Mattered).
15. At the end of the Clinton administration, the U.S. State Department and the U.K. Foreign
Ministry unveiled a narrower initiative involving a set of voluntary principles negotiated with
MNCs and NGOs to ensure that security arrangements to protect investments do not result in
human-rights abuses, as has been alleged in mining projects in Indonesia and oil extraction in
Nigeria (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_principles.html).and Southern NGOs are generally on the same page. When it comes to la-
bor and the environment, however, the direction of the redistribution of
incomes is less clear and divisions between groups—for example, between
environmentalists and unions or between North and South—tend to in-
crease. Sometimes the diﬀerences are over ends, such as whether develop-
ment of oil resources in the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge would de-
stroy the environment or create thousands of jobs at acceptable cost. But
often the diﬀerences are over means, such as whether or not trade measures
should be used to enforce labor or environmental standards.
The key labor critique of globalization rules is that they protect property
rights for investors and for intellectual property owners, but not worker
rights. These critics argue that international rules that promote and protect
capital mobility while restricting labor mobility skew economic outcomes
in favor of capital and against labor, especially low-skilled labor.
Although WTO members have steadfastly refused to discuss labor is-
sues, activist and union pressures on the trade system contributed to the
willingness of governments and employer groups to agree to a consensus
deﬁnition of core labor standards at the ILO. The 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work aﬃrms that all 175 members,
regardless of whether or not they have ratiﬁed the related conventions and
regardless of their level of development, have an obligation to respect and
promote
• Freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively;
• Freedom from forced labor;
• Freedom from child labor; and
• Freedom from discrimination.
Diﬀerences remain over how to implement these principles in practice, but
the declaration establishes the legitimacy of these core standards and cre-
ates a follow-up mechanism to monitor countries’ eﬀorts to promote
them.
While the meaning of freedom of association remains controversial in
many countries, particularly nondemocratic ones, the most divisive part of
the debate has been over proposals to incorporate labor standards in trade
agreements and to give the WTO the major role in enforcing them. While
much of the discussion of social clauses has been general and driven pri-
marily by the individual biases of the debater, at least two speciﬁc propos-
als have been made by the International Labor Rights Fund and the Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Both proposals
show sensitivity to the concerns of developing-country governments, trade
economists, and MNCs regarding the possibility of protectionist abuse. In
the former, the proposal requires that a panel of independent experts must
verify that a violation has occurred before any sanction can be imposed,
while the latter relies on the ILO to play a similar role. In neither case are
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dent or multilateral review.16
In addition to trying to use trade to strengthen enforcement of core la-
bor standards, labor and human-rights NGOs are also pressing develop-
ment institutions to be more sensitive to workers’ concerns when respond-
ing to ﬁnancial crises or planning development projects. In particular, they
argue that IFI concerns about labor-market ﬂexibility should be balanced
with concern for protection of worker rights and the adequacy of social
safety nets to ease the adjustment of displaced workers. Labor and human-
rights organizations are also involved in monitoring corporations (e.g., the
Workers Rights Consortium and the Fair Labor Association) and in put-
ting pressure on individual companies to change their practices (e.g.,
Sweatshop Watch and United Students Against Sweatshops).
Environmental concerns are the most diﬃcult to summarize or distill.
The range of issues is broad, the linkages to globalization complex, and the
diﬀerences between North and South often sharp. Important issues in-
clude combating pollution, climate change, species loss, deforestation, pre-
serving ecosystems that are particularly rich in biodiversity, and ensuring
adequate food health and safety.
There is a tension within the environmental community, however, be-
tween the desire to preserve domestic-policy autonomy and, at the same
time, the need to negotiate enforceable multilateral agreements to address
global problems—at least when those agreements are not universal. Thus,
environmentalists slammed WTO dispute-settlement rulings that ap-
peared to impinge upon domestic-policy autonomy—for example, Amer-
ican clean-air regulations on gasoline or the European ban on hormone-
treated beef. Another target is chapter 11 of NAFTA, which allows
investors to mount legal challenges to environmental or other regulations
that lower the value of their investments. At the same time, many of the
same groups have been equally harsh in criticizing other WTO decisions
intended to protect other countries’ sovereignty by limiting the use of trade
measures to enforce environmental laws (e.g., shrimping, tuna ﬁshing, and
turtle- and dolphin-protection disputes). In some of these cases there are
multilateral agreements, but they are without enforcement rules that ad-
dress the dispute; in other cases there are no rules at all. The concern is that
rules restricting the use of trade measures against nonsignatories to multi-
lateral environmental agreements encourage free riding.
There are also tensions between Northern and Southern groups regard-
ing priorities. The LDCs tend to be more concerned about developed-
country regulations, for example, those relating to food safety—that im-
pede their exports and their lack of capacity to develop standards of their
own. They also strongly oppose use of trade measures to enforce environ-
mental standards and agreements. There are also diﬀerences between de-
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16. See Harvey, Collingsworth, and Athreya (n.d.) and ICFTU (1999).veloping-country governments and Northern groups over the latter’s ad-
vocacy of increased transparency and access, especially in dispute settle-
ment in the WTO context, because of the asymmetries in capacity between
Northern and Southern NGOs and because of the lack of LDC govern-
ments’ legal capacity in dispute-settlement cases.
Biotechnology is a relatively new source of conﬂict, sometimes between
the North and the South as well as in other cases among developed coun-
tries. Some developing-country researchers join U.S. companies and advo-
cates in defending the potential beneﬁts for poor people of disease-resistant
strains of subsistence crops, but others oppose patenting of traditional
knowledge, which may restrict access while failing to adequately compen-
sate the “inventors.” Perhaps the most intense conﬂicts to date, however,
have been between the United States and European Union. There are areas
of agreement between environmentalists, economists, and LDC govern-
ments in some areas—for example, the need to address market failures in
resource pricing or the perniciousness of subsidies to ﬁshery ﬂeets, forestry
ﬁrms, and other resource sectors. There is also agreement between many
environmentalists and economists on agriculture subsidies, but diﬀerences
arise with small-farm advocates and some developing-country advocates
that want protection for small farmers and the rural poor for poverty rea-
sons. There is also often broad agreement on the reality of global commons
problems (e.g., global warming and the ozone hole), but there are big diﬀer-
ences on the distribution of the costs of addressing those problems and over
the relative use of carrots and sticks in implementation.
1.4.3 Globalization from the Ground Up
Ultimately, many critics view current international rules as promoting a
particular neoliberal economic model that they reject and clearly do not
want to see globalized. Responding to complaints from pro-globalization
critics, such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, that they
have no coherent alternative, the International Forum on Globalization
embarked in 1999 on a multiyear, transnational eﬀort to develop a broad,
comprehensive proposal for the fundamental reform of the global econ-
omy as well as of national and local economies. The preliminary result,
published in the book titled Alternatives to Economic Globalization: A Bet-
ter World is Possible!, stresses that supporters and critics of globalization
trends have very diﬀerent views of the direction of those trends—one side
believes that globalization is creating growth and spreading prosperity, and
the other sees mainly increasing inequality, erosion of community values,
and a degraded environment.17 The IFG is an alliance of sixty leading ac-
tivists, scholars, economists, researchers, and writers from twenty-ﬁve
countries, including the United States, Canada, Europe, Brazil, Chile,
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17. Though the full report was due for release in Spring 2002, only a summary was avail-
able as of early August; see http://www.ifg.org/alt_eng.pdf.India, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, and
Thailand. Their alternative vision tilts relatively more toward anti-
globalization than toward alternative globalization because it does not
agree that maximizing incomes and growth should be the goal of economic
policy and, therefore, rejects the key theoretical arguments in favor of freer
trade and capital ﬂows. The central values in this vision are democracy and
sustainability, and the key policy approach derived by the IFG is “sub-
sidiarity,” an approach to policy that “consciously favor[s] the local,” and
that redistributes power from “global bureaucracies and global corpora-
tions” to local communities and national governments. In this alterna-
tive view, “The proper role of global institutions is to facilitate the cooper-
ative  coordination of national policies on matters where the interests
of nations are inherently intertwined—as with action on global warming”
(IFG 2002, 6).
1.5 How Are Economists To Understand It All?
Many economists in universities and think tanks, as well as in policy po-
sitions, have been taken aback by the growing scope and intensity of the
global protest movement over the past ten years. To them, the recent his-
tory of globalization seemed largely to have delivered the once-wishful
hopes of the 1960s for development and prosperity.18“What’s it all about?”
is still a common question.19
In this section, we try to respond especially to international and some
development economists. This presentation may not do full justice to an
ideal characterization of the critics’ concerns, but it is at least an early at-
tempt to translate the concerns cross-culturally for a tribe who speak a
diﬀerent language. It will also not do justice to diversity within the tribe of
economists, but it is intended to highlight work from other ﬁelds within
economics and from other disciplines that may put the critics’ concerns in
a new light.
We try here to rationalize the opposition to globalization, using the logic
of rational choice, of course, but not of individualistic self-interest nor
materialism. Neither self-interest nor materialism is necessary to the dis-
course of economics, however prevalent.
In every case, we try to explain how an economist might more easily
understand the agendas of the critics and, where appropriate, respond
to them more constructively. We organize our discussion in three parts:
microeconomics, macroeconomics, and “metaeconomics.”
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18. Three recent and comprehensive articulations of the gains from globalization are made
by Lindert and Williamson (2001) and World Bank (2002a, 2002b), which are, respectively,
historical, forward looking, and current.
19. One well-known economist recently wrote, “I don’t really understand what it is that gets
the protestors in the streets,” articulating a common baﬄement within the profession, though
he had several conjectures.1.5.1 Microeconomic Critiques
Microeconomics is the study of decision-making by various types of
agents under various constraints and in various environments. Although
identiﬁed with individualism, microeconomic agents often represent social
groups, such as proﬁt-seeking and not-for-proﬁt ﬁrms, households, and
governments. This is perhaps the simplest and most fundamental way to
understand the critics’ agenda. It is often motivated by social identity, not
individual identity, and sometimes it is motivated by relative social-group
objectives (solidarity) in a manner familiar to most social scientists, but
less so to economists. In this microeconomic spirit, globalization’s critics
often emphasize diﬀerent objectives and preference sets and show greater
sensitivity to political as well as market failures that can undermine as-
sumptions about how markets work in some cases.
Diﬀerent Objectives
Family Preference. Some of today’s globalization critics still have at heart
the welfare of the national family with whom they identify. To them, fam-
ily preference is not protectionism any more than is the kind of special
treatment accorded to one’s own spouse, siblings, and children. It makes
sense from this perspective that those outside the family should be toler-
antly and justly treated, but not specially. To be indiscriminate in one’s
treatment of family members and outsiders would be just wrong and un-
loving.
But discrimination in favor of one’s family is implicit discrimination
against others. And classic free trade is deﬁned as the absence of such dis-
crimination or family preference at a national level. This is not popularly
understood. The case for open trade (i.e., no border barriers) is not the case
for free markets uber alles. Open trade simply implies no border discrimi-
nation against foreign suppliers or demanders. Open trade does not imply
unregulated markets; only that such regulation be even-handed, applying
equally to “us” and “them” (nondiscrimination). Likewise is the case for
openness in services and foreign direct investment (national treatment of
ﬁrms).
Of course, even classical, well-accepted reasons for discrimination and
national preference include responsibilities of citizenship (hence migration
barriers at the border) and national security, but some critics want a more
thorough return to the view that one’s nation is one’s family and should be
treated specially.20
Class Identity. Others, however, have emphasized class and other common
interests and experience as the grounds for social identity and suspect free
traders of having corporate-class interest at heart, whatever their rhetoric.
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20. See Anderson (1983) for a widely cited, though critical, treatment.These critics are often themselves internationalist. Some critics emphasize
traditional class categories, such as workers, and favor globalized labor re-
lations.21 Others emphasize religious identity (e.g., Muslim opposition to
globalization of secularism) or cultural parallelism (e.g., global opposition
on behalf of the world’s indigenous peoples), and still others emphasize
gender (Cagatay 2001; Heyzer 2001).
With these understandings, economists may see better that what matters
most to many critics are the aspects of globalization that economists usu-
ally call income-distributional eﬀects and consider less important than the
eﬃciency gains that globalization allows to national families. The critics,
by contrast, see the income-distributional eﬀects as primary.
Relative Position and Positional Goods. To many critics, furthermore, the
relative welfare of one’s family or community is just as important or more
important than its absolute welfare. They object to the globalization that
makes some elite countries and groups much better oﬀ than others, even if
all gain on average. Economists have been willing to accept this from the
perspective of national security, and political economists from the per-
spective of international power. But, increasingly, microeconomists are an-
alyzing the general microeconomics of relative objectives (e.g., envy, altru-
ism, power, and revenge) and discovering rational behaviors that appear
costly and ineﬃcient, yet satisfy deep nonmaterial human and social needs
and preferences.22
Greater Sensitivity to Values Reﬂected in “Goods”
Not all goods are “good” in the value schemes of many of the critics.
Globalization has facilitated exchange in a number of perceived social
“bads” (i.e., bad for me and bad for thee—which is the community of oth-
ers with whom I identify). Many progressives identify arms trade as bad;
many moralists oppose globalized gambling. People of many persuasions
oppose global sexual traﬃcking and trade in drugs, although often for
diﬀerent reasons. Economists traditionally claim to be reluctant to include
normative values in their reasoning. Yet when they are included as a type
of preference, they have the same foundational character as other prefer-
ences, including some nonmaterial preferences that economists have come
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21. See, for example, Frank (1999). This is, obviously, one way of rationalizing why I might
care about how things are made abroad, but production processesare not usually admitted by
trade economists as a permissible reason to oppose trade (but also see Rodrik 1997).
22. Much of the recent work of Robert Frank represents this view, as does research by
Blanchﬂower and Oswald 2000, for example, and others on whether and when material pros-
perity correlates with perceptual measures of satisfaction and happiness. See Frey and
Stutzer (2002) for a review and Wright (2000) for a readable summary that includes psychol-
ogy research as well. Recent experimental-economics research (Zizzo and Oswald 2001, as
summarized in The Economist, 16 February 2002, 69) suggests that the poor are indeed will-
ing to pay out some of their scarce resources to reduce the incomes of the rich.to accept without hesitation (e.g., risk aversion and altruism), and norma-
tive preferences can be analyzed using familiar economic methods.
Greater Sensitivity to the Unevenness of Constraints
International economists never tire of showing how global trading op-
portunities expand the choices available to individuals, groups, and coun-
tries. Critics are sensitive both to the gap between those enjoying greater
choice and those without it and to the possibility that when the “haves” ex-
ercise their expanded choice, the opportunities available to the “have-
nots” may actually shrink.
Thus, for example, it is not clear that the world’s indigenous peoples or
illiterate populations ﬁnd enhanced choices from globalization, and they
may in fact lose.23 Nor is it clear that globalization enhances choice for the
immobile, which are those whose genes or culture make them locally and
occupationally stationary relative to others (e.g., women and teachers of
tribal languages). Nor is it obvious that those who are geographically im-
mobile (workers of average skills facing migration barriers) gain opportu-
nity as a group from the enhanced choices of geographically mobile skilled
workers and owners of capital and other mobile resources.
International economists almost always answer that social redistribu-
tion of the overall gains from globalization (compensation) can leave
everyone better oﬀ, which is of course true. But as public advocates, they
rarely argue as strongly for practical diﬀusion-of-gains schemes within so-
cieties as they do for increased openness. “I do international economics,
not public or distributional economics,” they say implicitly and often
boldly, “potential compensation is enough,” but that does not satisfy the
critics who sense irresponsibility.24
It is surprisingly rare for economists to construct comprehensive distrib-
utional accounts of a Northern country’s gainers and losers from global in-
tegration; the identiﬁcation of such gainers and losers occupies much of the
political debate. (There is much more Southern research on these themes.25)
There is, of course, massive economic research on the functional income
distribution26 and on sectors (appropriate work when there are sector-
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23. For two classic treatments, see Wood (1994) or Sen (1999).
24. Some economists who leave the issue of actual compensation on the doorstep of do-
mestic government simultaneously criticize government for doing its business wastefully and
corruptly. The legitimate core of the argument is that compensation (redistribution) itself may
have a resource cost that should be factored into a three-way evaluation of the status quo,
deeper integration with compensation, and deeper integration without it. For a more detailed
discussion of how economists have struggled with the principle of compensation and how the
debate might gain from more cross-disciplinary work, see Kanbur (2002).
25. We have in mind research in development studies on Gini coeﬃcients and on rural-
urban diﬀerences.
26. Showing that, as a presumption for small- and modest-sized countries, deeper global-
ization necessarilyworsens the living standards of some factor owners (Stolper-Samuelson)—
unlike other policy trends and reforms.speciﬁc factors). Yet there is little research on the regional eﬀects of glob-
alization,27 little research on its eﬀects by size distribution,28 and little re-
search on its eﬀects on income-distribution volatility and mobility (e.g.,
mobility between quintiles within generations and across generations).
Realism About the Need for Protest
Economists sometimes ﬁnd conﬂict and protest, in contrast to negotia-
tion, to be intrinsically baﬄing.29 Yet microeconomists who study the eco-
nomics of contracts are familiar with the “hold-up” problem and its im-
plicit tensions. Applying its insights to explicit or implicit social contracts
is perhaps a helpful way to understand the economics of protest from a mi-
croeconomic perspective.
The hold-up problem is endemic to contracts. Once negotiated, con-
tracts are usually costly to break. In many cases, the contract’s value de-
pends on the sustainability of the relationship among the contracting
agents, and the assets involved in that contract have relationship-speciﬁc
value. In that case, there is an incentive for each agent through oppor-
tunistic behavior, including threats, to tilt the distribution of the relation-
ship-speciﬁc value in their favor. The natural response of the other agent is
resistance and protest, and opportunistic behavior is often provoked by
some change in the external environment of the contract that widens global
opportunities, for example.
Such opportunism and protest turn out to be more than just a distribu-
tional question. Hold-up problems cause microeconomic ineﬃciency—
speciﬁcally, underinvestment in all relation-speciﬁc assets.
Applied to social contracts, commercial opportunism coupled with
protest may be more than just a distributional matter, too. It may cause in-
eﬃcient, economy-wide underinvestment. Economists should perhaps be
as concerned as the critics if globalization encourages opportunism and
protest, and these problems in turn cause underinvestment in social capi-
tal of all kinds, ranging from “hard” infrastructure to “softer” trust in in-
stitutions and in each other.30This material provides a natural transition to
macroeconomic articulations of the critics’ concerns.
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27. But, see Yusuf, Wu, and Evenett (2000) and McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera (2002).
28. Smeeding and Rainwater (2000), along with others, have pioneered cross-country com-
parisons of welfare of similar groups at similar positions in their own country’s size distribu-
tion, but there is not yet enough time depth in the underlying data to do cross-country stud-
ies of response to trends such as globalization. International economists who have pioneered
continuum-of-goods models of general-equilibrium trade might easily shift their attention
and skills to continuum-of-talents models of factor rewards and exhaustively explore the
complete distributional eﬀects of globalization. Yeaple (2002) is a recent paper in this direc-
tion; Bond (1985) was a start.
29. As always, there are exceptions (e.g., Hirshleifer 2001).
30. A putative example of hold-up opportunism leading to loss of trust in the multilateral-
trade context is the history of the TRIPs Agreement and the possible reneging by the rich
countries on agricultural and textile/apparel concessions made in the Uruguay Round in re-
turn for poor-country acceptance of TRIPs.1.5.2 Macroeconomic, General-Equilibrium, and Political-EconomicCritiques
In a more macroeconomic spirit, globalization’s critics often seem to
have intuitively sensed thorny problems. They are often skeptics about
markets in general, whereas economists are enthusiasts, especially for
global and intertemporal (ﬁnancial) markets. But economists turn out of-
ten to share the skepticism of the critics in very speciﬁc ways. They recog-
nize and accept familiar shortcomings of markets across time, contingency,
and jurisdiction (e.g., local public goods). Unfortunately, in the policy de-
bate over globalization, these amendments to the general model too often
get lost.31 This failure in communication is in part because economists are
often skeptics about government intervention, whereas critics are enthusi-
asts, especially for intervention by accountable, transparent, democratic
governments—their preferred polity. But, since many developing-country
governments still lack these attributes, it is also odd that the critics focus so
little attention on national governments, compared to that focused on in-
ternational organizations.32
Financial Volatility, Dependence, and Debt Relief
Globalization makes available immense gains from intertemporal trade
and trade across contingencies,33 but it also exposes economies to ﬁnancial
volatility and crises of many kinds—bubbles, banking crises, exchange
crises, and sovereign-debt crises. Though there is a strong economic consen-
sus on best-practice (and second-best-practice) national institutions and
policies designed to modulate and deter ﬁnancial crises, almost none of these
institutions and policies exist at the global level. There is no global-equities
regulator, merely informal protocols for diﬃculties of sovereign debtors (or
the private agents that they guarantee) and only primitive, systemic banking
regulation (the Basel Agreements on bank capital). But ﬁnancial and insur-
ance markets have grown at the global level without adequate prudential dis-
cipline and insurance against fraud.34 Under these conditions, international
economists might have been more chary than they were about “unpro-
tected” ﬁnancial globalization and more sympathetic to the critics.35
Furthermore, there is a longstanding economics of eﬃcient debt relief
on which much of modern bankruptcy law is based (Miller 2002). Without
any formal provisions at the global level, there is no guarantee that open
global ﬁnancial markets will avoid ineﬃcient rationing and discrimination,
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31. Kanbur (2000, 14–15) remarks on the counter-productive tendency for economists who
do “policy messaging” to make their recommendations “sharp and hard,” out of concern that
if they “give [critics] an inch of nuance, they’ll take a mile of protection.”
32. Oxfam International (2002) is an exception.
33. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), World Bank (2001a), and DeSoto (2000), more popu-
larly.
34. Litan (2000) or Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni (1994), presciently.
35. Kanbur (2000, 15) views this as a major policy failure due to the “negotiating mindset”
of policy economists that inhibits giving ground.nor inequitable odious debt36—to say nothing of the “bad equilibria” dis-
cussed later.
Concerns over Homogenization and Vicious Circles
Critics often oppose both homogenization (Westernization or Ameri-
canization) and wasteful diversity (excessive variety and excessive provision
of luxury), and they can ﬁnd support for these concerns in economic mod-
els showing the uncertain general-equilibrium optimality of free-entry diﬀ-
erentiated-product (monopolistic) competition. From Hotelling’s classic
example of ineﬃcient concentration of hot dog vendors on a beach to the
familiar conclusion that monopolistic competition can sometimes create
excess competition and excess capacity,37 economists have a suitcase full of
reasons to doubt the automatic welfare-maximizing character of free trade
under diﬀerentiated-product monopolistic competition, which is itself a
strong candidate for the most relevant and truly global market structure.
Furthermore, critics often worry—more generally than regarding merely
debt relief—about poverty traps and vicious circles that might aﬄict poorer
countries and subpopulations. Once again, they can look to economists
who have pioneered models of multiple equilibria in spatial and dynamic
competition both within and among nations.38 In such models, some equi-
libria are demonstrably better than others on the usual welfare criteria. It is
not clear that economists should have so reﬂexive and unyielding conﬁdence
that capital markets will assure that the best equilibrium gets picked, since
imperfect-information economics shows us so often how capital markets
fail to do so and are themselves subject to multiple equilibria (Hoﬀ 2002).
So with these models in mind, economists and policymakers might dia-
logue with critics more fruitfully if they adopted a more nuanced, prag-
matic, and less ideological defense of globalization.
Intertemporal Concerns over Environment, Public Health, and Education
Critics worry over inadequate bequests of environment, durable public
goods, educational capital, and other property to the future, and they
worry further that globalization increases the rate at which the future is
mortgaged to reward those living now.39It is ironic that economists cannot
reassure them better, often relying instead on models with inﬁnitely-lived
actors and on overcasual appeals to the way that history hasn’t worked out
that way (yet).40 One reason, of course, is that market solutions seem im-
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36. See Kremer and Jayachandran (2002) and Birdsall, Williamson, and Deese (2002) for
recent treatments.
37. For example, see Suzumura (1995).
38. Graham and Temple (2001) are just one recent example.
39. Kanbur (2000) discusses diﬀerences in the time horizon over which economists and oth-
ers evaluate; this is not the same point we are making.
40. For example, in reaction to Club of Rome concerns over global resource depletion.possible when the problem is missingmarkets for intergenerational valuing
of durable goods, both public and private. And democratic social-choice
solutions do not help if there is the corresponding problem of missing poli-
ties for voting on relevant policies.
Elementary models of ideal intergenerational equity and sustainable
development are, of course, well-established.41 But such models often in-
volve extra-market ombudsmen and planners with (ﬁduciary?) responsibil-
ity to the future and ignore how such actors should be institutionally situ-
ated, for example, on the issue of ideal political scope and accountability.
(Should they have local, national, global constituents?) A very practical
application of the economics called mechanism design is called for, but, to
the authors’ knowledge, this does not exist.
Cases in point are easy to identify; these are not just abstract, academic
theories. Future generations, for example, are excluded from planning how
to cope with global warming and from debating how to manage global-
investment markets and worker (hence, taxpayer) migration with an eye to
the looming public-pension underfunding of many currently rich North-
ern countries.
Grassroots and Median Voter Concerns
Critics also worry about whether globalization overempowers elites and
what it does to the ordinary citizen and to the poor. Economists should rec-
ognize such concerns as relating to medians and “lower tails” of the income
and other distributions. But most international economists seem preoccu-
pied instead with aggregate gains from global integration—that is to say,
with mean gains, not medians or similar measures.42 Again, in the context
of the policy debate, globalization enthusiasts often seem reluctant to con-
cede that there are any losers at all.
Regarding the policy context, questions about the distribution of the
gains should be addressed explicitly. Is globalization less attractive the
greater the diﬀerence between a nation’s mean gains from trade and the
gains from trade earned by the median earner in the distribution?43 And if
the median earner actually loses, why would or should a democracy em-
brace policies that deepen global integration? Should it not resist or
protest at least until some explicit provision is made for diﬀusing the gains
from trade more widely (i.e., until potential compensation becomes ac-
tual)?
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41. For example, either Phelps-Solow “golden-rule” saving, consumption, and growth
paths, overlapping-generations models of social insurance, or equitable equilibrium-dynamic
price trajectories for nonrenewable resources.
42. McCulloch, Winters, and Cirera (2002) is an exception to this preoccupation and pro-
vides earlier references to research in this same distributional spirit.
43. Dutt and Mitra (2002), for example, show this empirically in capital-abundant coun-
tries. Most of the earlier economic research on median voters and protection has been nar-
rowly theoretical.Concerns About Regulatory Capture, Corruption, Checks and Balances
Capture. Critics often complain that the institutional architecture of glob-
alization unduly reﬂects a corporate agenda. They may have it right with
respect to business capture of nascent global regulatory initiatives, such as
in the TRIPs Agreement, in the attempt to forge a multilateral investment
pact with legal recourse for foreign investors that arguably exceeds that of
local ﬁrms,44 and in quasi-oﬃcial institutions, such as the Transatlantic
Business Dialogue, and standards-setting bodies. Economists familiar
with the economics of regulatory capture will immediately recognize the
potential for global versions of its ineﬃciencies and inequities.
Corruption. Furthermore, there are many channels by which globalization
may facilitate the diversion of public goods, property, and revenues into
private gains.45 Resource-wasting rent seeking and the possible growth of
cross-border versions of it are just two examples of how open trade can fa-
cilitate trade in perceived bads as well as goods. Since openness can also
constrain venality and corrupt policy, however, neither economists nor oth-
ers ought to rush to judgment over whether the gains of the goods exceed
the banes of the bads in any particular case. Measuring the bads ought to
be a natural cooperative enterprise of globalization’s critics and enthusiasts.
Checks and Balances. Finally it is worth remembering that the WTO and
GATT have a peculiar and unique parentage in the Havana Charter for the
stillborn International Trade Organization. Whatever one thinks of its
merits and demerits, its intent was clearly to provide balanced rules for
global commerce, including attention to small business and workers.
Therefore, why is it so obvious to defenders of status quo globalization that
the current boundaries and precedents of the WTO are appropriate and
that there are adequate checks and balances to the narrowly commercial
interests reﬂected there? Why not a constitutional convention on the new
WTO46 or on a genuinely new international economic order? As the critics
often say, “we don’t oppose globalization; we oppose the unbalanced rules
governing this globalization.”
Centralization and Subsidiarity Concerns
Last, it is worth remembering that some of the classic (and often com-
plex) economics of ﬁscal federalism and urbanization have some morpho-
logical application to the concerns of globalization critics. Examples are
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44. For example, see chapter eleven of the NAFTA agreement (available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp).
45. See Elliott (1997).
46. Esty (2002) can be read as sympathetic to this view. Barﬁeld (2001) and Howse and
Nicolaidis (2001), by contrast, recognize the constitutional problem in the WTO, but think a
procedural exercise in constitution-building would be fatal to it.• The uncertain welfare economics of interjurisdictional tax and infra-
structure competition with capital (and other factor) mobility across
boundaries;47
• The eﬃciency and equity implications of global and local regulation,
the value of local political autonomy (e.g., better information about
activities being regulated), and optimal subsidiarity;” and
• Among other considerations, whether burdens of capture and perils of
corruption are greater or less when regulation is global versus local.
1.5.3 Metaeconomic Critiques
In addition, there are still broader concerns that we call metaeconomic.
Most spring from the fact that commercial rights are being harmonized
and globalized steadily—property rights, intellectual-property rights,
rights to have local regulatory standards recognized abroad (mutual recog-
nition), rights to local judicial standing and compensation for foreign in-
vestors in host countries, and rights to migrate temporarily for skilled busi-
ness professionals. But is such narrow global momentum on commercial
rights self-evidently desirable?
• Is it desirable without equal global momentum on other important hu-
man rights, such as freedom from forced labor and freedom of asso-
cation?48
• Is it desirable without renewed debate over whether such rights should
be assigned only to individuals or to groups also? If so, what kind of
groups would be sanctioned to enjoy rights? Free labor unions, reli-
gious and civil-society associations, and indigenous-people groups
(i.e., land and resource rights)? This is an issue because global com-
mercial rights increasingly accrue to incorporated ﬁrms that are taken
all too reﬂexively to be groups of persons entitled to enjoying such
rights. But if so, why not rights for other groups? Historical American
jurisprudence validated the identiﬁcation of American ﬁrms as per-
sons with respect to property rights, but the global suitability of such
validation has not yet been established.49
• Is it desirable without global governance structures that nest those
rights within some democratically accountable (possibly global)
polity that develops such rights, conditions them, implements them,
and enforces them? If the only real human rights (as opposed to hor-
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47. See Wilson (1996).
48. See Charnovitz (1999), among others, for a sympathetic treatment.
49. For an economic analysis, see Glaeser and Schliefer (2001). More generally, American,
German, and other countries’ economic, political, and social history is worth studying seri-
ously for possibly global lessons about the “necessary nexus” among single-market deepen-
ing, federal political procedure, law and judicial oversight, social mobility, and regulatory
protocols and institutions. DeSoto (2000), for example, treats a number of these topics, most
deeply for Peru and the United States. Frost, Richardson, and Schneider (2003) treat them
historically for the European Union and the United States.tatory ideals) presuppose nation-states that oversee them,50 shouldn’t
international human rights, including commercial rights, presuppose
a more serious global political order than is currently embedded in the
United Nations?
1.6 Where do We Go From Here?
Having tried to characterize globalization’s critics in terms and concepts
familiar to its defenders, we ﬁnish by asking whether there is any common
ground between critics and defenders (rather than just a ﬁght for raw su-
premacy). Can talkers and doers talk together? Can they do together?
What might the doing look like?
Thus far, there has been some working together on issues related to the
process of international economic policymaking. The World Bank, IMF,
and WTO are all more transparent than they used to be and, to varying
degrees, also more open to input from a broader variety of stakeholders
than before. The NGOs and grassroots groups do not necessarily get a vote
in these intergovernmental institutions, but the institutions, particularly
the Bank, have recognized the value in designing more eﬀective and sus-
tainable projects and in policies of listening to a wider variety of voices.
Although critics still complain that the consultation process is more rhe-
torical than real, these organizations accept the need for increased
transparency and accountability in Bank and Fund policy development.
The WTO remains the least open of the three, but it is releasing more doc-
uments more quickly and the appellate body has agreed that it can accept
submissions from NGOs in dispute settlement cases. However, the latter
remains controversial, and the WTO remains the most government cen-
tered of the international economic institutions and the least open to civil
society input.
Policy economists and the three major international economic institu-
tions are also responding to the critics by addressing poverty and inequal-
ity more explicitly in their analyses of globalization and, to varying de-
grees, in their programs. While some question whether or not the IMF
should be in this area at all, it is shifting the focus of its long-term lending
from extended structural adjustment to poverty reduction and growth. The
World Bank is funding fewer large infrastructure project and lending more
for human resource development. Health and education, which are at the
top of the list of millennium development goals developed by the United
Nations, along with social protection accounted for nearly one-third of
new World Bank loan commitments in 2001 (World Bank 2001b). There is
also evidence of changing attitudes at the WTO, the most obvious being
that the outcome of the ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, which
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50. For example, see Ignatieﬀ (2001).launched a new round of trade negotiations in November 2001, is being
called the Doha Development Agenda.
The area that remains the most contentious is the substance of the rules
themselves. What needs to be harmonized, coordinated, or globalized, and
what can be reserved to national or local governments? But there are areas
upon which pro-globalizers and the critics of current globalization should
be able to agree on the need for new rules. Concerns about corruption are
broadly shared, although reactions to this issue also underscore the diﬀer-
ent approaches that fuel the debate over globalization. The critics focus on
the alleged role of the international ﬁnancial institutions in feeding cor-
ruption through loans and projects that are diverted for personal gain. The
IFIs focus on the need for corrupt and inept national governments to get
their own houses in order. Nevertheless, both defenders and critics funda-
mentally agree that corruption can be a major impediment to development
and that steps to increase transparency and accountability are required.
Promoters and critics of globalization might also agree on trade rules in
some new areas that could both improve the functioning of markets and
make globalization more equitable, environmentally friendly, and politi-
cally sustainable. Already, a number of governments, economists, NGOs,
and others agree that an unquestionably positive proposal for promoting
trade, environmental sustainability, and development would target subsi-
dies for farming and ﬁshing. More controversially, economists and ac-
tivists might agree that reforms to the TRIPs agreement could balance in-
tellectual-property protection with incentives for diﬀusion (Richardson
2001). Activists who are concerned about the increased and potentially
anticompetitive reach of MNCs might join with economists and others
who favor limited competition rules to guard against cartels, for example
(Richardson 2001; Oxfam International 2002). The role of corruption in
deterring or perverting foreign investment might also logically lead to
some agreement on at least minimal rules to protect investors from arbi-
trary actions by predatory governments and to protect people from hu-
man-rights or environmental abuses by corporations that are unregulated
by those same governments.
Increasingly, the question that we started with—whether or not the do-
ers willing to stop and talk—is being turned around: Are the critics only
talkers or are they also doers? As South African Finance Minister Trevor
Manuel said at the IMF World Bank Annual Meeting in Prague in Sep-
tember 2000, “I know what they’re against but have no sense of what
they’re for” (“Protestors Paralyze Prague,” Washington Post, 27 September
2000, A16). The NGOs are being asked to demonstrate their own legiti-
macy through increased transparency (e.g., regarding funding) and to be
explicit about to whom they are accountable and who they represent. One
close observer, who has worked both with NGOs and as a civil-society spe-
cialist at the World Bank, notes that it is important to analyze “who enjoys
Assessing Globalization’s Critics: “Talkers Are No Good Doers?” 47the beneﬁts and suﬀers the costs of what the movement achieves, especially
at the grassroots level” (Edwards 2001, 6)?51
Moving forward together will also require some changes in method. Af-
ter the death of the young man during the G8 protests in Genoa and, par-
ticularly, the September 11 terrorist attacks, organizing large protests
around each major international economic meeting appears to be reaping
diminishing returns. Concrete demonstrations of protest will almost cer-
tainly continue to play an important role, but the movement seems ready
to move beyond serial protesting or being “a movement of meeting-
stalkers, following the trade bureaucrats as if they were the Grateful Dead”
(Klein 2000, 20–21). Forgoing large street protests outside the Waldorf As-
toria in New York during the World Economic Forum meeting in January
2002 and gathering instead in Porto Alegre to discuss alternatives could
prove to be a turning point toward dialogue and toward more constructive
interaction between the critics and defenders of economic globalization.
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51. See Florini (2001, 39) and Clark (2001, 26) for other recommended NGO reforms to in-
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My comments are about the second part of the paper. The ﬁrst part is a
very interesting and useful survey and categorization of the anti-
globalization movement, for which the authors should be commended.
The anti-globalization movement is—we learn—to a considerable extent
pro-globalization, but wants globalization to proceed in diﬀerent ways and
with diﬀerent goals. The authors limit their scope to groups concerned
with economic globalization and involved in advocacy. These are placed
into four categories: development and poverty, human and worker rights,
environment, and multi-issue groups (global reformers).
Economists tend to have a dim and unfair view of the anti-globalization
movement and what it has to say, perhaps under the inﬂuence of television
coverage of violent protests in the streets of Seattle, Genoa, and other
places. The second part of the paper seeks to make the arguments under-
standable and acceptable to economists by using the language and con-
cepts of economics and appealing to well-known imperfections of institu-
tions, markets, and economic policies. I think Elliott, Kar, and Richardson
are quite convincing and successful in this. When translated into the lan-
guage of economists, it is obvious that many of the concerns raised by such
groups as Oxfam International make sense. But I cannot avoid a lingering
suspicion that as a description of the movement as a whole, much igno-
rance, misplaced criticism, and nonsense have been left out.
Furthermore, the paper tends to give the impression that most of the is-
sues brought up by the critics have been of no concern to academic econo-
mists, while it is possible to argue that the opposite is true. To take one of
the most obvious examples: Growth, development, and income distribu-
tion, both inside and between nations, have been on the agenda of devel-
opment and trade research for decades, including research at such institu-
tions as the World Bank (e.g., work by Hollis Chenery in the 1970s). Other
examples include the relations among growth, trade, and the environment;
the trade and wages debate; various aspects of the world trading system;
and the debt crisis. It is perhaps true that economists tend to be more in-
terested in what determines the size of the pie than how it is shared, but I
do think that it needs to be emphasized that many of the issues brought up
by the critics of globalization are not new.
What is puzzling to mainstream economists like myself is the emphasis
of the globalization critics on globalization, international organizations,
and multinationals in the context of poverty, underdevelopment, lack of
human and worker rights, and environmental degradation. Admittedly, the
World Bank can be criticized for putting too much emphasis on large in-
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distributional consequences of stabilization programs, the WTO for giving
developed-country ﬁrms too strong property rights in the TRIPS agree-
ment, and multinationals for their conduct in poor countries and against
weak governments. But the fact is that these institutions have made great
contributions to the improvement of living conditions for the world’s poor.
Developing countries are very actively seeking World Bank loans and are
participating in project design. The IMF steps in when national gover-
nance and governments have failed. The WTO system provides much-
needed rules for world trade and has contributed to a substantial reduction
of trade barriers during the last half-century. As for multinationals, most
developing countries actively seek and compete for their investments.
One cannot help thinking that the focus on international trade and in-
vestment and on international institutions is opportunistic and largely mis-
placed. The focus should be on national governance and national policies:
the lack of democracy, corruption, bad policies, badly protected property
rights, privileges for the elite, and so on. The international institutions and
globalization serve as scapegoats, when the really important barriers to
economic development and well-being lie in the national, not the interna-
tional, arena.
In fact, one can well argue that globalization has very positive eﬀects in
putting restrictions on national governance and policies. National auton-
omy is often used to pursue bad governance and policies, as in North Ko-
rea and Burma (to take extreme examples). Exposure to international
trade and factor movements, and participation in international coopera-
tion and institutions tend to prevent government mismanagement. (We do
not have to go to developing countries to ﬁnd examples: the creation of the
European Monetary Union has placed much-needed discipline on bad na-
tional monetary and ﬁscal policies.)
It must be pointed out that my misgivings about the anti-globalization
movement are not intended as criticism of the paper. They can, however,
explain why economists are less than enthusiastic in their views of the
movement.
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